#Reach for the Stars

YTUMUN 2025

ECOSOC STUDY GUIDE

Agenda Item:
Youth Employment and the Future of Work in the AI-Driven Economy

Board Members

Zehra Akçay

Doğa Ince

Abdulkarim Doughan

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YTUMUN

1. Letter from the Secretary-General

Dear Esteemed Participants and Guests,

Dear Esteemed Participants and Guests, It is my distinct honor and privilege to welcome you to YTUMUN'25. As Secretary-General, I am thrilled to invite you to what promises to be an enriching experience of debate, diplomacy, and collaboration mixed with unforgettable moments and memories.

Model United Nations is more than just a simulation of the UN; it is a platform where ideas meet action, and where the leaders of tomorrow practice the art of negotiation today. Whether this is your very first conference or one of many in your MUN journey, we are committed to providing you with an environment that challenges you intellectually and inspires you personally.

This year, our Secretariat has worked tirelessly to craft a conference where everyone feels welcomed. We believe that the variety of our topics reflects the complexity of our world and ensures that every delegate finds a space where their voice matters, and that every single participant will leave with amazing moments carved in their memories.

On behalf of the entire Secretariat, I thank you for joining us. We look forward to witnessing the passion, creativity, and leadership that you will bring to the conference. Together, let us make YTUMUN'25 a memorable and transformative experience for all. Let us reach for the stars!

Yours sincerely,
Bilel Elarem
Secretary-General of YTUMUN'25

1. Introduction to the Committee: Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Established under Chapter X of the United Nations Charter in 1945, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is one of the six main organs of the United Nations (UN). ECOSOC is responsible for the direction and coordination of the economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and cultural activities carried out by the UN. It is the UN's largest and most complex subsidiary body.

3.1 Members of ECOSOC

Although originally consisting of just 18 countries, later amendments to the UN Charter in 1965 and 1974 expanded the committee to first 27 and then to 54 members[1] . This newly established number of members has not changed since then. Members of the Economic and Social Council are elected by the General Assembly, for three-year terms[2] . Membership is also based on geographic representation, as each geographic region is allocated a certain number of countries in the committee[3]. The breakdown is as follows: 14 'African' States, 11 'Asia-Pacific' States, 10 'Latin American and Caribbean' States, 6 'Eastern European' States, and 13 'Western European and Other' States[4] . The Committee meets throughout the year and holds a major session in July, during which a high-level meeting of Ministers discusses major economic, social and humanitarian issues[5]. Each member of ECOSOC has one vote. Decisions are taken by simple majority vote[6]. Four of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States of America) have been continuously realected because they provide funding for most of ECOSOC's budget, which is the largest of any UN subsidiary body[7]. The presidency of ECOSOC changes annually[8].

3.2 Functions and Powers

Chapter X of the United Nations Charter sets out the mandate and functions of the Economic and Social Council as follows:

Article 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

Article 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly." (9)

ECOSOC is empowered to recommend international action on economic and social issues; promote universal respect for human rights; and work for global cooperation on health, education, culture and other related areas(10) . It is the principal body for discussing international economic and social issues, formulating policy recommendations, fostering debate and innovative thinking and forging consensus on ways forward. The Council has been reformed on many occasions with the most far-reaching reform being the reforms of 2013. On 20 September 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution 68/1, which recognized the lead role of ECOSOC in identifying emerging challenges and promoting reflection, debate and innovative thinking on development, as well as in achieving a balanced integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development.(11)

In recent years, therefore, ECOSOC has also taken up the responsibility to deal with sustainable development in light of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Council plays a key role in fostering international cooperation for development. Since 2013, The Council has has been following the development of the international community and has been placing on its agenda topics about the relations between developed and developing countries, environmental science and technology and the preservation of natural resources. Resolution 68/1 also furthered the mandate of the Council via the provision of power to adopt annual themes and power to monitor and control the balanced integration of the three domains of sustainable development**.**

ECOSOC links a diverse family of UN entities dedicated to sustainable development, providing overall guidance and coordination(12). The entities include regional economic and social commissions, functional commissions facilitating intergovernmental discussions of major global issues, and specialized agencies, programs and funds at work around the world to translate development commitments into real changes in people's lives(13). Most of ECOSOC's work is performed in functional commissions on topics such as human rights,

narcotics, population, social development, statistics, the status of women, and science and technology[14]. Therefore, ECOSOC coordinates the activities of various UN programs and specialized agencies such as the Human Rights Council and the Commission of the Status of Women. These commissions meet regularly and report back to ECOSOC. The council also oversees regional commissions for Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Western Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These commissions deal with special problems that people live in different geographical areas face[15]. ECOSOC has five regional commissions that promote economic development and cooperation in their respective regions: Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)[16]. Currently the Economic and Social Council oversees 14 UN specialized agencies, 8 functional commissions and 5 regional commissions: in addition to receiving reports from 9 UN funds and programs[17].

The UN charter also allows ECOSOC to grant consultative status to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), thereby maintaining a vital link between the United Nations and civil society[18]. Beginning in the mid-1990s, measures were taken to increase the participation of such NGOs, and by the early 21st century more than 2,500 NGOs had been granted consultative status.

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item: Youth Employment and the Future of Work in the AI-Driven Economy

As we all know of course, if only the reasoning alone were what made us human, today we would all be soulless, utilitarian chatbots, using all our creativity as a tool to serve pragmatic purposes. Music would be reduced to the dry rules of music theory; notes would be the language of formulas, not emotion. Literature would be nothing more than small question-and-answer boxes where information is conveyed most quickly and accurately; our tears, our fragility, and our inner world would have no meaning. Yet, a human being is not merely a machine seeking the quickest and most practical solution to every problem; not an empty shell of flesh, but rather a complex whole carrying not only reason but also heart, intuition, and wounds. Despite all its technological leaps, humankind is still meaningful through this wholeness. If we have opened the door to the incredible process we call the "artificial intelligence revolution" today, yes, even though ChatGPT and Gemini can write

impressive poems and Sora can produce unimaginable images, all of these are ultimately inspired by the meanings, cultures, and data we have created; their imagination is a derivative of our accumulated memory.

As the “middle children”[19] of history, are witnessing a unique scene. We are in an era where we talk more to AI assistants than to search engines; sometimes we delegate our creativity to them, effectively turning off our own thinking abilities and expecting them to think for us. We over-share our inner world with these systems, and then ask them to over-explain it to us. On the one hand, we are experiencing an unprecedented level of cognitive outsourcing, and on the other hand, we are trying to share the burden of being human with these new digital minds in the name of speed and efficiency.

So today, as humanity ages generationally, retirement ages are stretching upwards globally; while someone who started working in 1974 worked until age 60, we are now expected to work an extra 6 years, 66 years instead of 60[21]. We live in a world where information is at our fingertips, but owning property is much more difficult than in previous generations. Younger generations are significantly less likely to own a home compared to their parents at the same age; in many countries, homeownership rates for those under 35 have fallen below 40%, and young people are forced to postpone leaving their family homes until later ages due to rising housing prices and interest rates [22]. In the midst of such a structural transformation, in this AI-based economy, will the millennial generation, Gen Z and Gen Alpha, become a disposable “transitional generation,” or will they be able to become the true agents of this transformation?

We have neither Emeklilikte Yaşa Takılanlar (EYT)[23] to lean on , nor can we dream of a world where wealth is distributed more equally; for today, the richest 1% of the planet possesses more wealth than the remaining 95% of the population [24]. This is precisely why there is no generation that can understand us better than ourselves: we are both old enough to remember the analog world and young enough to have been born right into the digital and artificial intelligence age. For most of us, working life has now become a marathon of almost 45-50 years, assuming one enters the workforce in their early 20s and retires in their mid-60s [25]. If artificial intelligence systems are going to take over a significant portion of the jobs we currently do, it's clear that competition will intensify in a world where finding a job is already noticeably more difficult than before, with approximately 65 million young people unemployed as of 2023, about 13% of young people aged 15-24 worldwide considered unemployed, and projections for 2025 indicate that 262 million young people are neither in

education nor employment.[26][27]Therefore, there is a question before us that is perhaps even more important than the future of the concept of work and employment: What will be the fate of our generations in this new age of artificial intelligence? To find the right answers to these questions, we first need to take a look at the history of artificial intelligence, from its entry into our lives initially through a news report about a chess match to the point where we can reach it in seconds by saying "Hey ChatGPT".

4.1. Checkmate in 1997: Early AI from Logic Machines to Kasparov vs. deep blue

When we talk about artificial intelligence, what we actually mean are systems that can partially or completely perform "tasks thought to require human intelligence": pattern recognition, decision-making, prediction, language processing, etc. However, these systems are not, as we often attribute to them, beings that "possess a soul" or "share our destiny." They do not possess consciousness; they do not form intentions, assign meaning, or construct their own value. They are tools designed for specific goals, consisting of layers of data and algorithms. Therefore, artificial intelligence should be read not as a new "self" replacing human intelligence, but rather as a technical appendage, a prosthesis of the mind that has extended beyond the body, externalizing, accelerating, and scaling some functions of human intelligence. What makes it dangerous or salvific is not whether it is inherently "good" or "bad," but rather the intention with which it is programmed, the power relations within which it is embedded, and the socioeconomic order it serves. In other words, artificial intelligence is a tool that holds a mirror up to us; what we see in the mirror tells us more about our history, our ambitions, and our blind spots. So, in the end, the real question always boils down to humanity, not "artificial intelligence."

The intellectual roots of this artificial intelligence story go back to Alan Turing, who in the mid-20th century grappled with the question of "can machines think?". In his famous 1950 paper, instead of directly answering this question, Turing discussed whether machines could exhibit human-like behavior through a "game of imitation"; this is the beginning of what we call the "Turing test" today.[28] Just a few years later, in the summer of 1956, at a workshop held at Dartmouth College, John McCarthy and his colleagues coined the term "artificial intelligence" and institutionalized the idea of "thinking machines" as a separate field of research [29] . Thus, the abstract discussion that began with logic machines began to transform into concrete experiments on programmable digital computers.

The early days of artificial intelligence were largely dominated by an approach based on symbolic logic and explicitly written rules. During this period, spanning from the 1950s to the 1980s, it was assumed that human thought was a process that operated with symbols; therefore, it was argued that machines could “reason” if enough rules, information, and inference mechanisms were coded [30] . Proving logic programs, expert systems, and limited dialogue software were products of this “good old-school AI.” However, this approach struggled to fully capture the ambiguities of the real world, language, and human behavior; the number of rules exploded, maintenance costs increased, and several periods of disappointment, referred to as “AI winters,” occurred [31] . Nevertheless, this early period laid the groundwork and conceptual framework for the data-driven AI systems that young people encounter today.

Against this historical backdrop, chess becomes both a symbolic and technical laboratory for artificial intelligence research. Chess is a game with clear rules, a limited state space, but astronomical combinations; therefore, it is seen as the "fortress of human intelligence." From the 1950s onwards, chess programs began to compete first with amateur players, then with masters and grandmasters. The most dramatic moment in this line occurred in 1997: IBM's supercomputer Deep Blue made history by defeating the then-world champion Garry Kasparov 3.5–2.5 in a six-game match in New York [32] . This match, known as the "1997 checkmate," made headlines on the one hand for artificial intelligence "defeating" human intelligence, and on the other hand, it revealed the limitations of early artificial intelligence: Deep Blue is not a "general mind"; It's a machine specifically designed for chess, incredibly compact but effective, relying on massive computational power and evaluation functions refined over years by human experts. Yet, this match can be read as an early sign of the AI-driven transformation that shapes young people's perceptions of work and the future, suggesting that even mental labor and "white-collar" skills could become targets of automation. After all, while chess bots now hover around 4000 ELO,

we humans are still stuck between 2900-3200 ELO, and I'm sure none of us would ever want to play a match against StockFish.

4.2. Beyond Prediction: Big Data, Deep Learning and the Rise of Generative AI

If the "checkmate" moment on the chessboard in 1997 was a symbolic turning point in the story of artificial intelligence, the 2000s and 2010s represent a paradigmatic shift that radically changed the direction of this story. Artificial intelligence experienced a transition from rule-based, manually written logic systems to statistical and probabilistic models that learn patterns from data on their own. Three fundamental forces made this transition possible: First, the acceleration of digitalization, where almost every human interaction—our messages, location information, clicks, purchases—became recorded and analyzable data; in short, the widespread use of "big data." Second, the decrease in the cost of processing power and storage capacity thanks to hardware advancements that go beyond Moore's Law; thus, calculations that used to take months can now be done in hours or even minutes. Third, the unexpected success of multi-layered artificial neural networks, or "deep learning," especially in areas such as image recognition, speech recognition, and natural language processing; The sharp reduction in the error rate of deep learning-based models in the 2012 ImageNet competition is one of the most cited symbolic examples of this leap [(33)] . Now machines “learn” the world not from the rules we write for them, but from the millions of examples we show them.

In this new era, artificial intelligence first becomes the engine of "prediction": systems that predict which advertisement will be clicked, which customer will default on their loan payments, which young person is at risk of dropping out of school, and which candidate will apply for which job advertisement, form the invisible infrastructure of the data-driven economy [(34)] . In this context, artificial intelligence tries to predict what we will do based on our habits. However, artificial intelligence does not know the future with certainty; but it derives probability distributions from patterns learned from past data and turns uncertainty into a manageable risk by quantifying it. These "prediction machines" begin to act as the hidden arbiter of the labor market, especially for young people: algorithmic scores operating in the background often decide whose CV will be rejected, who can borrow money, who will be insured, or which advertisements will appear on whose screen, rather than people [(35)] . Thus, youth employment becomes more than just job advertisements and interviews; It

evolves into a more complex ecosystem shaped by data profiles, scoring systems, and recommendation algorithms.

However, the real breakthrough occurs when we move beyond this predictive era and enter the phase called “generative artificial intelligence.” Deep learning models no longer merely predict the “next click” or “risk”; they transform into systems capable of generating language, images, sound, and even video. Large language models can learn the statistical structure of language from billions of words, writing coherent and contextually relevant texts; they can generate code, translate, and draft legal or technical texts. Similarly, visual models can produce photorealistic images, designs, and illustrations from a short text description [(36)]. Thus, artificial intelligence becomes an actor that not only “predicts us” but also “produces with us.” This blurs the lines between creativity and labor: a young designer, musician, writer, or programmer now competes not only with other people but also with machines capable of generating text and images.

In the age of productive AI, the picture is paradoxical for young people. On the one hand, unprecedented opportunities arise for a young person with almost no initial capital to produce content on a global scale, freelance, or start their own business thanks to these tools. On the other hand, many "white-collar" job fields such as copywriting, translation, design, customer service, data analysis, and even software development are beginning to feel the pressure of automation more intensely. The possibility of "machine replacement," which was discussed for blue-collar labor until recently, is now shifting towards cognitive and creative jobs. Therefore, when discussing the future of youth employment, it is necessary to focus not only on the question of "which jobs will AI eliminate?" but also on "what roles will young people be able to take on in this new production regime, which skills will remain valuable, and who will determine the direction of this transformation?" If we leave control in the hands of tyrants, then AI will work not for the benefit of humanity, but for the benefit of a few. Because productive AI is not a fatalistic force that writes the future for us; On the contrary, it is a new infrastructure that we shape through institutions, policies, and our collective choices, but which also carries the risk of losing control. Whether this infrastructure will produce either a new “digital proletarianization” or a more inclusive and creative employment order for the middle children of history will be determined precisely by today’s decisions.

4.3. When Text Started Talking Back: Socio-Economic Impacts of ChatGPT-Style AI

As we mentioned, Deep Blue's "checkmate" of Garry Kasparov in 1997 was a challenge to human cognitive ability; however, the real breakthrough occurred when the text began to speak back to us. With the public launch of ChatGPT in November 2022, artificial intelligence for the first time ceased to be merely a technology operated in the background by companies and became one of the most visible aspects of everyday life. Reaching 100 million monthly users in just two months [(37)] , it became one of the fastest-growing consumer applications in internet history [(38)] . By 2025, we are talking about a world where hundreds of millions of weekly active users, and according to some estimates, even 700–800 million users, regularly interact with such tools [(39)] . These figures show that ChatGPT-style systems are not only a technological innovation but also a socio-economic phenomenon at the heart of the "future of work" debate. It's not just the numbers; when we think about our own lives, how many of us still ask Google about things? Haven't we seen a shift from "Google it" to "Ask chat about it"?

This widespread adoption and transformation has also fundamentally altered the role of artificial intelligence in daily life. While text-based chat interfaces haven't completely replaced classic search engines, they have become the first point of contact for "digital intelligence," especially for young people: evidence is increasingly showing that uses such as writing homework, creating exam preparation plans, drafting CVs and cover letters, editing LinkedIn profiles, practicing foreign languages, and similar tasks are becoming widespread among young users [(40)] [(41)]. In the workplace, functions such as summarizing meeting notes, generating email drafts, preparing report and presentation texts, standardizing customer relations correspondence, writing code, or debugging are becoming increasingly routine [(42)]. Thus, ChatGPT-style systems are no longer merely tools for accessing information, but are transforming into "cognitive companions" that are directly embedded in our thinking and writing processes; silently reshaping the ways we learn, remember, and create.

On a macro scale, this transformation's impact on the "future of work" holds both promise and risk. According to McKinsey's analysis, generative AI has the potential to add between $2.6 and $4.4 trillion in added value to the global economy annually [(43)], and it is estimated that approximately 60–70% of tasks in knowledge-intensive jobs across many sectors are open to partial automation [(44)]. (According to World Bank data, Germany's Gross

Domestic Product in 2024 was approximately $4.66 trillion.) McKinsey also predicts that, specifically in the US, generative AI will radically transform the composition of job tasks, particularly in areas such as office support roles, customer service, and some finance and legal jobs [45] . Goldman Sachs, on the other hand, suggests that such systems could automate tasks equivalent to approximately 300 million full-time jobs worldwide, and that scenarios of 10–15% increases in labor productivity are possible in the medium/long term [46] . These projections show that a significant portion of the jobs that younger generations will enter may be under pressure to transform even before they fully enter the labor market.

Micro-level experimental studies provide concrete evidence of how ChatGPT-style systems reshape labor processes. A large-scale field experiment in customer service showed that call center employees using generative AI-powered assistants increased their productivity by an average of 14 percent, with the greatest gains experienced by employees with relatively low experience (“lower skill group”) [47] . Similarly, access to ChatGPT for mid-level professional writing tasks shortened task completion time by about a third in an MIT study, while also significantly improving output quality; moreover, this effect was reported to be stronger, especially in participants with low initial performance [48] . In software development, developers using tools like GitHub Copilot completed certain tasks much faster on average, with time savings reaching up to 50 percent in some studies, and a large majority of developers reported that these tools increased their productivity and job satisfaction [49] . All these results show that generative AI acts as a “skill accelerator,” especially for young and relatively inexperienced employees; It suggests that by partially closing productivity gaps, it can redefine hierarchies in the workplace. [50]

In terms of creativity, the picture is both promising and worrying. On the one hand, young people who are not strong in language or technical writing can transform their ideas into more fluent texts, refined drafts, and professional-looking presentations thanks to these tools; they also have the chance to experiment in fields such as music, visual arts, design, and writing at almost zero cost. This significantly reduces the barriers to participation in cultural production. On the other hand, the fact that a significant portion of text and visual production is guided by similar models carries the risk of homogenizing forms of expression, producing an aesthetic that is "averaged," and leading young creators towards cliché patterns. Some studies show that users accept AI output only with superficial corrections, and that human-machine collaboration often turns into "automatic draft approval" rather than "co-creation" [51] . In the long run, this may mean the atrophy of some writing and thinking

skills, and that creative labor may be seen as more easily replaceable. In other words, it means the atrophy of one of the most important things that makes humankind human: the ability to "create." Ultimately, each of us could delegate the task of thinking to these kinds of chatbots and continue to intoxicate our dopamine receptors in a way that deviates from their natural cycle.

In conclusion, ChatGPT-style AI appears to younger generations in the "future of work" debate with a double-faced mask. One face is that of a partner that increases productivity, supports creativity, partially strengthens equality of opportunity, and opens up new job and entrepreneurial fields all over the world; the other is a force that shortens career ladders, eliminates entry-level positions through automation, pushes creative expression towards a single average aesthetic, and brings labor under tighter control through algorithmic surveillance. *As we have always said* , today's youth are also "the middle children of history": a generation that experienced great wars through algorithms and great depressions through debt, insecurity, and uncertainty, yet never gave up on the desire to be the main subject of the story. The real question is whether we will become a passive "digital proletariat" of these systems, or whether we will choose to negotiate with this order as subjects who design, manage, and define the ethical boundaries of AI. Therefore, considering youth employment and the AI-based economy together is not merely a matter of the distribution of technical skills; it is also a profound political and philosophical question about who will be the subject and who will be the object, and whose destiny will be determined by whom: because this time, it is not each other we must “beat”, but this new digital order itself, which is silently trying to push us into the background. At least for now, the time has come to talk about the “working class” of which we are the subjects and the “labor” of which we are marketed as objects. In our world where the “empty mind” attacks itself, it is time to say a few words about unemployment and the labor economy.

4.4. Introduction to the Labor Theory: “Workers of the World, Re-Skill!”

From hunter-gatherer societies to the agricultural revolution; from feudal systems to the industrial revolution and today's digital world where machines fit in our hands, much has changed, but very little has truly remained unchanged. In the cultural equation, where each individual represents a unique complexity, as conditions, beliefs, geographies, and institutions transform, so do the results; each society draws different conclusions from its own historical account. Nevertheless, one of the rare elements that has emerged as almost the same constant in every era from this great historical equation is always "labor."

This is why labor is considered sacred in many religions; every morsel earned through honest means and sweat is given meaning beyond its material value. In Islam, it is said, "Man has nothing but the reward of his labor"[52] ; in the Christian tradition, the expression "The laborer is worthy of his wage" stands out [53]; and in the Jewish tradition, with the saying, "You will eat from the labor of your hands; you will be happy and everything will go well," earning a living through one's own labor is depicted as a source of both worldly and spiritual blessing [54]. In cultural terms, labor has been viewed in different societies not only as "work" but also as a matter of identity and honor: the legitimacy of "hard work" in Anatolia, dedication to one's job in Japan, and the imprint of mastery on objects like a signature in artisan communities are examples of this understanding. Of course, the value of labor is not only found in religions and cultures, but also at the heart of the social science we call economics. Economics, which questions "how we use our scarce resources," could not be considered fully economics without pursuing the scarcest and most indispensable resource – human labor.

4.2.1 Fundamental Concepts: Employment, Unemployment and NEET

If we are talking about labor and the value of our labor, we first need to clarify where this labor stands statistically. That is, who has a job, who doesn't, and who is actually lost in the shuffle, often relegated to the margins of the statistics... At this point, the definitions of the ILO (International Labour Organization), the most frequently used framework at the international level, come into play.

According to the ILO [55], employment means having worked for economic compensation during the reference period. This definition is surprisingly broad: a person is considered employed if they have worked for income for even one hour during the reference week. This work does not necessarily have to be a white-collar position in a corporate office; it can include many different forms such as setting up a stall in the market, working as a courier, working part-time in a cafe, working regularly in a family business even without pay, or taking on projects as a freelance software developer. Therefore, “employment” is a broader and more technical category than the “full-time, insured job” we use in everyday language.

Unemployment, according to the ILO [56], does not mean “everyone who is not working”; it is a narrower and more conditional concept. In order for a person to be considered unemployed, three conditions must be met at the same time:

1. *Not actually working in any job during the reference period,*
2. *Being fit and ready for work (able to start work in a short period of time),*
3. *Actively seeking employment (for example, applying for jobs, looking at job postings, attending interviews in recent weeks).*

From this perspective, individuals who "prefer not to work for the time being," have completely given up searching for work, or have not attempted to find work for an extended period are technically not considered unemployed, but rather "outside the labor force." In other words, unemployment is not simply a state of lack of income, but also an indicator of the extent to which the system can respond to individuals who say, "I want to work."

The third category, which is extremely critical from the perspective of youth policies, is NEET. NEET, an abbreviation for “Not in Education, Employment or Training,” is used especially for young people aged 15–24 and indicates three exclusions simultaneously: These young people are neither in education (school, university, course), nor in employment (working in any job according to the ILO’s definition of employment), nor in any training or vocational education program. In other words, they are neither in the classroom, nor in the workplace, nor in any intermediate stage preparing them for working life [(57)]. For this very reason, the NEET situation is not simply a state of “idleness,” but often a state of invisibility, of being simultaneously excluded from the institutional spheres of the system.

If we add the picture of Turkey to this framework, the situation becomes more concrete. According to TÜİK and ILO data, in 2024, the youth unemployment rate for those aged 15-24 in Türkiye was around 16-17% [(58)], while the NEET rate among young people – that is, those who are neither in education, employment, nor any course – was reported to be close to 30%; according to OECD and ILO calculations, this rate is still about twice the OECD average in recent years [(59)]. In other words, one in three young people in Türkiye lives their lives without being in school, working, or participating in an educational program that prepares them for working life. This shows that seemingly “technical” concepts such as employment, unemployment, and NEET are actually very concrete breaking points that find their counterparts in the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of young people: some are trying to hold on within the labor market, some are waiting on the sidelines, and some are completely outside of it. For this very reason, it becomes inevitable to consider the labor-value debate in conjunction with the working methods of the artificial intelligence age in the next step.

4.2.2 Types of Unemployment (Structural, Cyclical, Technological)

When we think of unemployment as a single large gray cloud, we neither fully see what we are fighting against nor do the solutions become intertwined. However, unemployment is not a monolithic problem; it is a picture that changes according to its cause, and therefore its solution also changes. That is why behind the number we call the "unemployment rate" there are three main areas with different stories, especially for young people: cyclical, structural and technological unemployment [(60)].

Cyclical unemployment gets its name from the “ups and downs” of the economy. When the economy is growing, companies produce more and hire more people; when the economy is contracting, the first reflex is to cut costs and reduce employment. This is basically defined as a type of temporary unemployment created by fluctuations in the level of economic activity [(61)].

Structural unemployment, on the other hand, describes more persistent mismatches that arise when the sectoral composition and skills structure of the economy change. As some sectors and occupations shrink while new ones grow; the skills in demand change, and the mismatch between the skills of job seekers and the demands of the market increases, structural unemployment rises [(62)]. This is associated with factors such as technological change, globalization, regional inequalities, and the quality of the education system, rather than short-term cyclical activity.

Technological unemployment is the unemployment that arises as a result of the disappearance or reduction in scope of certain jobs due to the increased use of machines, automation and software in production processes [(63)]. This phenomenon, which has been discussed since the industrial revolution, has now expanded to affect jobs in cognitive and service sectors with artificial intelligence and digitalization.

The critical point for today's youth is this: these three types of unemployment are no longer isolated from each other; they are often intertwined. While a global economic downturn (cyclical) occurs, some sectors may lose power permanently (structural) and the content of jobs may change with artificial intelligence and automation (technological) at the same time [(64)]. A young university graduate may not only be unable to find a job because of the crisis, but also because the market value of their field of study has weakened, and they may also have to compete with software and artificial intelligence systems in the fields they want to enter.

In fact, at this very point, our discussion on types of unemployment naturally leads us to the middle children of history, that is, those "trying to enter the game for the first time." Because what we call cyclical, structural, and technological unemployment often shows its harshest face to the generation taking its first steps into the labor market . When crises occur, young people with little experience are eliminated first; when economic structures change, young people who "studied in the wrong field" are declared incompatible; and when technological transformation accelerates, those who are still at the beginning of their careers find the rules of the game being rewritten before they even learn them. Therefore, understanding the position of young people in the labor market is possible not only by looking at the "youth unemployment rate," but also by examining how that fragile corridor we call the school-to-work transition works. In section 4.2.3, we will take a close look at this corridor, that painful transition process where young people leave university classrooms, vocational schools, and courses and arrive at the doorstep of the real working world.

4.2.3 Youth in the Labor Market: School-to-Work Transition

When we consider youth alongside the labor market, we are actually circling around a very simple question: How and in what timeframe can a young person transition from school to “real” life, that is, to work? Social sciences call this process the “school-to-work transition”; but for most young people, it is less a technical concept and more the feeling of “I graduated, so what now?” Looking at it on a global scale, the numbers also show how fragile this transition is: In 2023, 64.9 million young people aged 15–24 were unemployed worldwide, which corresponds to approximately 13% of the young workforce; in the same year, approximately 20% of young people worldwide were NEET, meaning neither in education, employment, nor any training/vocational program [(65)]. Two-thirds of this NEET group are young women.

From an OECD perspective, the picture becomes more layered. Some young people aged 18–24 are still solely in education, some are both studying and working, some are only working, and some are in the NEET category. In OECD countries, the average NEET rate for the 18–24 age group is around 14–15% [(66)]; in contrast, approximately 18–19% [(67)] of young people in the same age group are both studying and working. In other words, youth is not simply a homogeneous block divided into “students” and “unemployed”; on one hand, there are those working part-time between classes, on the other hand, those who have graduated and are looking for full-time jobs, and in yet another corner, those who can find a place neither in

school, nor in a job, nor in any program. The school-to-work transition process is precisely the sum of these transitional states.

When we look at the picture of Turkey, it becomes clearer how bumpy this transition is. OECD and national data [68]show that the NEET rate among 18–24 year olds in Türkiye [69] is slightly above 30%, more than double the OECD average of around 14%. In the same age group, the NEET rate rises to 40% for young women and above 20% for young men [70]. In other words, one in three young people aged 18–24 in Türkiye are neither in school nor in work nor in any program that invests in their education or vocational skills. This shows that the school-to-work transition is not only “difficult” but has become a process that has almost gone beyond institutional pathways for a large segment of young people.

Behind these figures are very familiar stories. Let's consider a young person who has studied at university for four, maybe five years; struggled to find an internship; spent months chasing job postings after graduation and receiving "negative" emails. Or another young person who had to drop out of high school and then tried to survive in informal and low-paying jobs... Turkey is one of the countries with the lowest employment rates for both high school and university graduates within the OECD; recent reports show that university graduate unemployment exceeds the general unemployment rate, meaning that a diploma alone does not mean a "secure transition" [71]. Therefore, the school-to-work transition is not just a "school is over, I've got a job" line; for most young people, it is a zigzag path full of short-term contracts, low wages, periods of unemployment, and the search for courses/certificates again.

International studies highlight that this transition period has a lasting impact on young people's entire working lives. The World Bank, ILO, and academic literature show that young people who remain unemployed for a long time at the beginning of their careers, who are in NEET status, or who can only hold onto informal and precarious jobs, face lower wages, a higher risk of unemployment, and weaker social protection in later life [72]. In other words, bottlenecks in the school-to-work transition create not just a "delay of a few years," but a long-term "causing effect." On the other hand, well-designed transition policies – quality vocational training, on-the-job programs, mentoring services, active labor market policies for young people – can mitigate this injury; they can enable young people to transfer the knowledge and skills they acquire in education to real jobs more quickly and fairly.

When we look at this table from a generational comparison perspective, we see that the feeling of being trapped that today's youth experience is not merely "subjective." Studies

in many countries show that younger generations – especially millennials and Gen Z – leave home later, become homeowners later, and pay rent for longer periods compared to their parents' generations [73]. For example, in the US and Europe, the percentage of those who own their own homes at age 35 is around 70–75% for the generation born in the 1940s, while it has dropped to approximately 50–55% for the generation born in the 1980s[74]. Young adults either never reach the threshold of "saving and homeownership," which was a turning point in the lives of previous generations, or they reach it much later.

This shift in the housing market is directly linked to the issue of "making ends meet." In many countries, it is reported that young people under 30 allocate more than 30% of their income to rent, meaning they are technically considered "under rent burden" [75]. The situation is even more severe in large cities: even a one-bedroom apartment can become almost unaffordable with the average young person's salary. While housing prices and rents are rising rapidly, young people's wages are not increasing at the same rate; or the increase is not offsetting the surge in inflation and housing costs. As a result, the "self-reliance" that previous generations were able to achieve at a relatively younger age is becoming a long struggle for many young people today.

A similar gap is observed in terms of wealth accumulation. Some studies show that millennials in their mid-30s have a lower median wealth compared to Baby Boomers of the same age; moreover, about 14% of millennials have negative net worth (i.e., a situation where their debts exceed their assets), while this rate remains around 8–9% for Boomers [76]. In other words, some life milestones that were considered “normal” for previous generations, such as owning a home, getting out of debt at a certain age, and saving even a little, have become much more challenging thresholds for young people today. Indeed, some reports describe millennials and Gen Z as “generations at risk of having worse financial conditions than their parents for the first time” [77].

In the Turkish context, these global dynamics—high youth unemployment, chronic NEET rates, rising housing costs, and rents in major cities—are transforming the school-to-work transition from simply a "job-finding process" into a "struggle for survival." The statement from parents, "We also faced many difficulties when we were young," should certainly not be dismissed lightly; however, objective data shows that today's youth are also dealing with much higher housing costs, flexible and precarious work arrangements, and a more intensely competitive environment. Therefore, the issue is not about who is more

"grateful" or less "complaining," but rather that generations of the same age are waking up to different economic landscapes.

This is precisely why understanding young people solely through the lens of unemployment rates is insufficient. A young person's transition from school to work isn't simply a matter of "how many months did it take to find a job?"; the quality, security, salary, skill-based performance, and future prospects of that first job are just as important as the time it takes. In countries like Turkey, where NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) rates are high, graduate unemployment is chronic, and the housing crisis directly impacts young people, the school-to-work transition acts as a mirror simultaneously revealing all the cracks between the education system, the labor market, housing policies, and the welfare state. In the next section, we will look at this mirror with the shadow of artificial intelligence and automation: When discussing future unemployment and how the school-to-work transition might take shape for young people in the age of AI, it will be necessary to approach this data not merely as cold numbers, but as notes on the life stories of "history's middle children." The story of us, "history's middle children," who may live better off than our grandfathers and fathers in terms of what humanity can achieve, but in worse conditions than we can.

4.2.4 Future of Employment-Unemployment and School-to-Work Transition in the AI-Driven Economy

It's impossible to understand the future of work without understanding unemployment. Therefore, when we talk about the future of unemployment, we're not just asking "how many people will be unemployed in the future?"; we're dealing with something deeper: how much of a reality the dreams young people have today will have in tomorrow's labor market. As we saw in the previous section, the transition from school to work is already a fragile corridor in itself; it's not a straight road that everyone can walk at the same speed, with the same confidence, and with the same opportunities. Now, AI-driven transformation, automation pressure, flexible and precarious work arrangements, platform economies, project-based jobs, and the constant need to "update oneself" are added to this corridor. In short, young people are no longer just graduating and looking for work; they are also stepping into a future where the rules of the game, the players, and even the stage itself are changing before they can fully enter the game. The middle children of history are not in the same circumstances as their grandfathers or fathers. Millennials, Gen Z and Gen Alpha are particularly close to becoming the generation lost in the shuffle. Because they are sadly closer to being lost in a transitional

period than both their grandfathers and fathers. Even more tragically, their great-great-grandfathers perished caught between two world wars. We, on the other hand, will perish because automation has been created in our place, and we will be lost amidst creative destruction or destructive creation.

Therefore, when we talk about the "future of unemployment," we're not just talking about unemployment rates going up or down, but about the changing form of unemployment : short-term projects rather than full-time jobs; multiple platforms rather than a single employer; transitional states that are less classic and more insecure and less visible... In 4.2.4, we will discuss precisely this: how the transition from school to work might look in the future, and whether artificial intelligence and economic transformation will make this corridor narrower for young people, or make it more passable in different ways. Here, the issue will not be just about "finding a job"; we will examine together how "meaningful and sustainable work that allows one to build a decent life" becomes a horizon for younger generations.

Looking at this picture from an AI perspective, we see that the future employment-unemployment divide is increasingly shifting from a simple "jobs available/no jobs available" dichotomy to a question of "what kind of work is available, for whom, and under what conditions?" The biggest risk for young people is not being completely unemployed, but rather being trapped in a state of permanent semi-unemployment by constantly working "part-time" jobs, project-based, piecework, and on platforms managed by algorithms. On the one hand, cool titles like "freelance," "consultant," and "creator" are accumulating on LinkedIn profiles; on the other hand, a growing group is emerging with no regular income, no insurance, uncertain vacation rights, and almost no dreams of retirement. While AI-powered platforms theoretically make finding a job easier, they also facilitate the fragmentation, standardization, and rapid delegation of work to someone else when needed. The "school-to-work transition" is therefore increasingly resembling a "school-to-platform" transition: young people are no longer forced to accept a single employer, but rather a series of applications, algorithms, and scoring systems. In this new system, statistics will begin to show us that a young person who appears to be "employed" may, in practice, be working for half the month and unemployed for the other half; spending part of the year in Istanbul and part in their hometown; constantly "online" on screen, but constantly "incomplete" in life. This is precisely why discussing the unemployment of the future in the age of artificial intelligence requires not only questioning the number of unemployed , but also the quality, continuity, and security of work, and how individuals view themselves and their future.

If we only look at the dark side of the picture, it seems as if the only option for young people is to fade into obscurity in the shadow of automation; however, the story is yet to be written. Artificial intelligence can also be a tool that can be used to make the transition from school to work fairer and more visible for young people. Well-designed systems can help identify earlier who has which skills, which areas they are inclined towards, and what support they need; and can offer personalized guidance and skill matching opportunities. The school-to-work transition can cease to be a lottery left to the individual "luck" of young people and become a bridge consciously built by society. But for this, a political will, social policy, and a culture of negotiation in which young people see themselves as subjects are needed, demanding that artificial intelligence be used not only for productivity but also for livelihood and dignified work. Otherwise, we will be left with an incredibly powerful technology, but a young generation that does not have fair access to the value it produces and constantly lives with the anxiety that "tomorrow could be even worse."

5. Artificial Intelligence and Future of Work

The United Nations doesn't just strive to build a war-free order; it also acts as a mediator in creating a more just economic and social order. In this chapter, we will try to understand AI and its impact on the future of work from all angles. Because if we fail to create the right conceptual equations, we absolutely cannot ensure a more beneficial transition for humanity. Therefore, we will first try to understand artificial intelligence and its impact on our future from a conceptual, then a political, and finally an economic perspective.

5.1 Philosophical Aspect of AI and AI's Impact on Transformation of Working Class

5.1.1 From “Schole” to Screen Time: Aristotle on Work, Leisure and the Good Life

For Aristotle, the good life is not merely a life where one's stomach is full and bills are paid; it is an existence in which one can realize oneself through thought, virtue, and communal living. Therefore, he uses the concept of "s*chole”* (what we translate today as "leisure") not as the name for idleness, but as the name for time spent freely thinking, learning, and debating. *Schole* is not the "surplus time" left over from necessary work; it is the actual time when a person is truly human, when they can maintain virtuous and rational activity[78][79][80]. Work (*ponos*), on the other hand, is more the realm of necessity; it is the instrumental activity endured to sustain life. Contemporary interpretations of Aristotle also emphasize that *schole is a political and philosophical concept rooted in the words* school and

scholar ; and that the political institution must protect this "free time" to make the good life possible[79][80]. Bringing the discussion of the "future of work" in the age of artificial intelligence together with Aristotle is therefore provocative but meaningful: Our question is not simply "will there be jobs?", but " will there be *schools where young people can live like human beings* ?"

When we look at today's youth, we see a time crisis experienced in two extreme forms. At one extreme are NEET youth: those who are neither in education, nor employment, nor in any training/vocational education program. According to ILO data from 2023–2024, approximately 20.4% of young people worldwide are NEET, and the NEET rate among young women is about twice that of young men (28.1% versus 13.1%) (81). In other words, one in five young people is experiencing a state of forced gap, a state of institutional ties broken, into which they have been forced involuntarily. This situation is directly measured by one of the sub-targets of SDG 8, 8.6; the United Nations aims to "significantly reduce the proportion of young people aged 15–24 who are neither in education, nor employment, nor training" by 2030 (82)(83). At the other extreme are young professionals who are online 24/7, interrupted by notifications, working flexible but often limitless hours: although technically appearing to be “employed,” almost all of their lives are confined to emails, messages, meeting links, and platform dashboards. For one group of young people, it's an excess of time; for the other, it's a poverty of time; in both cases, little remains of what Aristotle understood as “*schole” , that is, free and quality human time.*

Digitalization and artificial intelligence are further sharpening this picture. ILO reports on working hours and work-life balance reveal that long and irregular working hours have serious effects on physical and mental health; the way working hours are organized directly shapes the family and social lives of workers [84][85]. The same analyses show that while digital technologies create flexible working, working from home, and new forms of employment, constant computer use and information overload increase work stress and the risk of burnout [84][85]. AI-powered tools can theoretically take over some routine tasks and increase productivity; this has the potential to open up shorter working hours and more *school* opportunities for young people on paper. However, in practice, the increase in productivity often risks turning into an expectation of "more work in less time" instead of a reduction in workload, i.e., an increasing pace of screen time. In such an environment, young people can either find themselves in a forced void because they cannot find a job, or when they do find a job, they can be trapped in an endless cycle of "screen time" that consumes their lives.

ECOSOC and the Sustainable Development Goals (especially SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth) come into play precisely at this point. SDG 8 aims not only for economic growth but also for “full and productive employment and decent work for all”; “decent work”, as defined by the UN and ILO, means not only income but also fair wages, job security, social protection, freedom of association and working hours that are in line with human dignity [82][83]. For young people, this goal requires taking two extreme risks seriously at the same time: reducing NEET rates (8.6) and preventing young people who are employed from being trapped in inhumane paces and algorithmic pressure in the age of artificial intelligence. ECOSOC's founding philosophy, which states that peace is not merely the absence of war but also a just economic and social order, intersects with Aristotle's intuition of the "good life": If productivity increases with artificial intelligence, it is precisely the Council's task to ask whether this increase provides young people with more *school* – time for learning, thinking, resting, and participating in social life. This is where the philosophical message of this guideline hinges: The "future of work" debate cannot be reduced to simply the question of how many young people find jobs; it must also question whether these jobs expand the possibilities for young people to live, think, and contribute to the world like human beings in the age of artificial intelligence.

5.1.2 The Programmable Proletariat: Alienation 2.0 in the Algorithmic Workplace

For Marx, labor is not merely “work,” but the backbone of the relationship a person establishes with himself, others, and the world. Therefore, what he calls alienation *is* not merely a moral complaint, but a structural consequence of the capitalist mode of production: the worker is separated from the product he produces, the production process, his “species essence,” and other people; a state of both objective and subjective distance emerges. [86][87][88] He cannot touch what he produces, he has no say in the process, he experiences work not as a field in which he realizes his potential, but as a “necessity endured for subsistence.” Consider the classic factory worker: he repeats the same movements on the assembly line, often unaware of what he produces, why he produces it, and what kind of mark it leaves on the world. This alienation, which Marx described in the 19th century, takes on a new form today in digital workplaces managed by artificial intelligence and algorithms; this is precisely why the metaphor of the “programmable proletariat” is disturbingly familiar to today’s youth.

In the AI-powered platform economy and in what we call "gig work," the work process is often designed by an algorithm rather than a human manager: the code decides which task is matched with whom, how much to pay, how long it should take to complete, and

sometimes even who is considered a "good worker." ILO and OECD reports show that algorithmic management is becoming increasingly common in platform work; applications guide young workers within a task-score-feedback cycle, and the processes of work distribution, scoring, and account closing are often not transparent.[89][90][91] Let's consider a young courier or call center employee: when they go "online" to the application, everything is determined by instructions that appear on their screen, from which order to take, where to go, how many minutes it should be delivered, and sometimes even what to say to the customer. Here, as Marx described, the work ceases to be the worker's own conscious activity and becomes a series of reflexes where the worker performs micro-tasks broken down into parts by the algorithm. Alienation 2.0 is exactly this: This time, it's not just the boss who comes between us and the product, but an invisible layer of code.

This new system comes with claims of both freedom and control for young people. Platforms promise flexibility with slogans like "enter whenever you want, exit whenever you want," and "be your own boss." However, field research reveals that a significant portion of young gig workers, in particular, face irregular income, earnings below minimum wage, lack of social protection, and intense algorithmic surveillance.[90][92] Young people who cannot get work if the app's rating system is low, whose accounts are suddenly suspended due to customer complaints, and who feel compelled to stay online until late at night because of the rating algorithm, may formally appear as "independent workers," but in practice have less bargaining power than a traditional worker. To the alienation that Marx described as "separation from the product, the process, oneself, and others," today, "inability to detach from the algorithm," that is, the compulsion to be constantly visible, is added. Even when the work is finished, the app continues to live in the mind of the young worker through notifications and rating screens.

At this point, it becomes critical to understand ECOSOC and the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth, and their perspective on technology. SDG 8 emphasizes the principle of “decent work” along with “full and productive employment”; this principle, within the framework of the UN and ILO, means not just a salary, but fair wages, safe working conditions, social protection, freedom of association, and a workplace that respects human dignity.[82][83][17][23] So the issue is not how many platform jobs are created for young people; it is whether these jobs are turning them into a new “programmable proletariat”. While ECOSOC’s founding philosophy states that peace is not only the absence of wars but also a just economic and social order, it also requires

us to question how algorithms are embedded in labor processes: Are young people becoming empowered labor subjects thanks to artificial intelligence, or are they becoming passive targets of a more finely tuned control system?

Global initiatives on youth employment, such as the “Decent Jobs for Youth” platform, therefore focus not on quantity but on quality: The aim is to enable young women and men everywhere to access more “decent jobs,” that is, to build a rights-based and sustainable working life that does not merely appear to be technically employed.[13][81][93]) Artificial intelligence and algorithmic management are not “neutral tools” in this context; depending on how they are designed and regulated, they can be either a mechanism that deepens alienation or an infrastructure that protects the rights of young workers and strengthens their voices. The fundamental question facing ECOSOC hinges precisely on this: In the age of AI, will young people be merely “programmable” elements of labor processes, or will they be citizens who have a say in the design, control, and ethical boundaries of algorithms? This guide invites delegates to consider this second path: to view Alienation 2.0 not as fate, but as a changeable political choice, and to reposition younger generations as the true subjects behind the code.

5.1.3 From Rolling the Boulder to Scrolling the Feed: Camus, Sisyphus and the Existential Search for Meaning in Work



Albert Camus's Sisyphus is a figure eternally punished by the gods: He will roll the same rock up the same slope, watch it slip from his grasp and roll back down when he reaches the summit, and start again. The cycle never ends; there is neither ultimate success nor definitive liberation. In Camus's reading, this myth is an allegory of the "absurd," that is, the tension between man's search for meaning and the silence of the world[94][95]. When the world does not offer us ready-made meaning, man either falls into despair or, in the midst of this meaninglessness, produces meaning from his own attitude, from his own labor. That is precisely why Camus says, "One must imagine Sisyphus happy"[96]: Every time the rock rolls back, Sisyphus pauses for a moment, looks at his fate,

and chooses to continue "yet"; meaning, since it is not given from the outside, must be sought in man's stubborn decision to continue[94][95].

For today's youth, working life often creates a similar cyclical feeling: endless emails, goals reset daily, unaccumulated likes, constantly changing algorithmic rules… This time, the rock isn't a stone; it's KPI charts, performance reviews, the pressure to "stay up-to-date," and an endless stream of notifications. The fatigue isn't just physical; the weight of the question, "What am I striving for?" feels like an invisible burden on the shoulders each time. And this Sisyphus-like state is familiar not only to young professionals working in office buildings, but also to those struggling to survive in precarious jobs, in the platform economy, in part-time, seasonal, and temporary work: the rock rolls sometimes as a diploma, sometimes as a CV, sometimes as a loan, sometimes as rent, and sometimes as the pressure to "prove oneself."

Artificial intelligence adds a strange duality to this picture. On the one hand, AI tools may seem like technologies that lighten Sisyphus's rock or even remove some rocks altogether: systems that automate routine tasks, speed up report writing, coding, translation, and data analysis, have the potential to direct humans towards "more creative, more meaningful" work. On the other hand, this very increase in productivity raises the question in the minds of young people: "If machines can now do these jobs, what is the meaning of my labor, and even my existence?" As the ILO has pointed out in its studies on youth employment trends and "youth employment and anxiety," even though global youth unemployment rates are falling in some regions, anxiety about the future, job insecurity, and mental health problems continue to increase among young people (96)(97). In other words, indicators that appear "better" quantitatively can coexist with more uncertainty and a sense of "displacement" in the inner world of young people. This time, Sisyphus's rock is not just rolling downhill; Occasionally, it moves on its own, transforming into an object that can be taken away.

Amidst all this, the daily ritual we call "scrolling the feed" functions like a modern Sisyphus myth: When the day's fatigue is over, the middle child of history picks up their phone; they scroll upwards with their finger, and new content, new news, a new crisis, a new success story appears. There is no sense of accumulation; with each scroll, the previous image falls down, just like a rock rolling down a mountain. This flow sometimes satisfies the need for rest; sometimes it painfully reveals the distance between "other people's lives" and one's own life. Here, Camus's question is updated: Can we capture that brief moment when we "look back at ourselves," not while rolling a rock, but while scrolling the screen with our

finger? In moments when the work we do, the technology we use, the economy we live in doesn't offer us ready-made meaning, can we create new meanings from our own values, relationships, and networks of solidarity?

The language of ECOSOC and the Sustainable Development Goals is often technical: “employment rate”, “labor productivity”, “NEET rates”, “growth targets”… But SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth carries a deeper question at its heart: Is “decent work” for young people merely a secure income, or is it also about belonging, contribution and meaning?(98)(99) While the official framework of SDG 8 aims for “full and productive employment and decent work for all” by 2030; the ILO defines “decent work” as fair income, job security, social protection, freedom of expression and association, opportunities for personal development and social participation(98)(99). If peace, as stated in the founding philosophy of ECOSOC, is not only the absence of war but also a just and humane social order, then we must place the existential relationship that young people have with labor at the center of that order. In the age of artificial intelligence, when the "future of work" debate is limited to the question of "which jobs will remain, which will disappear?", we risk handing over Sisyphus's rock to technology and turning humanity into mere spectators. However, the real issue is not just who is rolling the rock, but why we are rolling it: the ability of young people to be subjects who negotiate not just productivity figures, but the meaning of their own lives in an AI-powered economy. We can translate Camus's radical suggestion about Sisyphus to ECOSOC's youth and employment agenda in this way: the rock will always be rolled, the algorithms will always be updated; the important thing is whether we are leaving a space for young people to still imagine themselves happy within this cycle, that is, to remain human. And the real question is: Sisyphus was punished by this routine for deceiving the gods. So, in this AI age, while we are the ones worried about losing our jobs, why are we being punished? And did those who punished us do so solely for the sake of greater profit?

5.1.4 Billionaires Replacing Feudal Lords: Techno-Feudalism in Today's World[109]

The person who largely systematized the foundations of techno-feudalism and presented it to us as a theory is the Greek economist and former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis. Our approach to this theory will be fundamentally critical. Techno-feudal theory is essentially a way of thinking that argues that capitalism is dead and has been replaced by a system we call techno-feudal. To understand this way of thinking, it is first necessary to understand what the feudal system is.

In summary, the feudal system can be described as a kind of land-based and hierarchical order of mutual dependence and loyalty. At the top of this system was a king, below whom were the large landowners, the lords, and the knights, whose military loyalty was purchased by the lords in exchange for land and protection. At the bottom of this hierarchy were the serfs and peasants. They cultivated the land and gave a portion of the produce to the lord. They also had very limited freedom to leave the land. It can be described as a system with strict class divisions and status determined by a birth lottery, where upward social mobility was incredibly difficult.

Now let's talk about the techno-feudal system. In the feudal system of the Middle Ages, land was indispensable and vital. In today's world, it's data and digital infrastructure. In feudal systems, lords took large shares of the produce from the peasants; now, techno-feudal "lords" control platforms and data, collecting the rent generated by the digital economy. They constantly collect data, commissions, and if they can't get these (after all, most social media applications are free), attention span from both users and sellers entering the platform "realm." And these lords are now walking hand in hand with politicians. If Donald Trump is seen walking hand in hand with tech billionaires, it is absolutely no coincidence. As users, content creators, and small and large companies become increasingly dependent on these platforms, the value they produce, the digital footprint they leave, the commissions they pay, and of course, the "ability to focus and attention span" stolen from us, are increasingly accumulating in the coffers of these digital lords. Proponents of techno-feudalism argue that the source of wealth is no longer just profit earned in competitive markets, but the access fee charged at the platform's gates . After all, aren't we all paying "tolls" to provide the conditions necessary for an AI algorithm to favor us?

5.2 Economic Aspects of AI

5.2.1 Schumpeter's Creative Destruction or AI's Destruction of Creativity

Joseph Schumpeter was a significant economist, politician, and thinker who left his mark on economic thought in the 19th century. Schumpeter's definition of capitalism is what made him who he was. He saw capitalism not as a static system of equilibrium, but as a dynamic process constantly producing change and upheaval. That is, the profit motive drives people to produce, to produce more, to produce more easily and quickly, to produce more complex things than simpler things. We can call this the storm within capitalism. Entrepreneurs destroy the old and build the new by creating new technologies, new systems,

and new methods. We can give the example of the disappearance of calligraphers with the advent of printing. Essentially, Schumpeter calls this destruction of the old by the arrival of new things "creative destruction."

History has proven to us that this creative destruction has repeated itself many times. The profession we call ***"hattat"*** refers to the person who practices the art of writing with Arabic letters. This profession was quite respected in the Ottoman Empire. Because, as an art form, it played an important role in the palace, mosques, official correspondence, and the hand-copying of books. And it was a craft that required a great deal of patience and discipline, involving a long process of learning from a master. The fate of the Ottoman Empire was to catch up with most developments in the world quite late, and this was repeated itself in the field of printing. The first Turkish printing press established by Muslims in the Ottoman Empire was founded by İbrahim Müteferrika in 1727. The Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730 was not directly about the printing press, but it is associated with the Tulip Era, with its luxury that harmed the public and its innovations that were somewhat opposed by the public. Of course, Müteferrika's printing press was also present within this climate. And with the further spread of printing, hand-drawn copies disappeared. This situation can be summarized as "creative destruction."

We can read a similar story of creative destruction, this time not from the Ottoman era, but from the Industrial Revolution. In England, artisan weavers who wove fabric on hand looms, much like calligraphers, were people who had been trained for years through master-apprentice relationships, adding their skill and personal signature to their work. However, with the spread of steam engines and mechanical looms in the 18th and 19th centuries, centuries-old skills were suddenly declared "slow" and "expensive." Many weavers, just like Ottoman calligraphers faced with the printing press, felt defenseless against the new technology; even the Luddite rebellions, in which machines were destroyed in some regions, arose precisely from this helplessness. But history also shows us this: as old forms of production declined, completely different professions and sectors emerged; fields such as factory work, machine maintenance, engineering, and logistics gained strength. So creative destruction was not just about the "destruction" part; but for the generation caught in between, the process was still traumatic. Today's young white-collar workers, feeling threatened by artificial intelligence, are actually quite similar to the weavers of that era: some of the skills they've painstakingly developed over years are being declared "automable," while new professions and opportunities are often relegated to the uncertain horizon of the future. This is

precisely where the core of creative destruction lies: the newcomer not only kills the old, but also determines who will bear the burden, who will profit, and who will be added to the list of "vanishing professions."

5.2.2 Impacts of Creative Destruction(?) of AI in Employment

History has shown us time and again that creative destruction is always on stage; only the scenery changes, the drama on stage remains the same. Just as the steam engine squeezed the weaver, the printing press the calligrapher, and the assembly line the small craftsman; today, artificial intelligence is reshaping labor in offices, factories, and in front of screens. The OECD's 2023 Employment Outlook report shows that artificial intelligence has not yet created a huge shift in overall wages and total employment; but it is significantly changing how work is done, what skills are needed, and the anxiety levels of employees [(100)]. The same report shows that while a significant portion of employees who already use AI in their jobs say their job satisfaction has increased, two out of three employees fear losing their jobs to AI in the next 10 years [(100)(101)]. So, creative destruction hasn't yet left everyone unemployed; but it has taken root in everyone's minds.

The International Labour Organization's (ILO) "Generative AI and Jobs" study, dated 2025, estimates that globally, one in four jobs has the potential to be significantly transformed by generative artificial intelligence [(102)(103)]. In high-income countries, this rate rises to one in three; moreover, it adds that exposure is concentrated especially in office and administrative jobs and affects women's employment more than men's [(104)(105)]. The critical point underlined by these studies is this: GenAI's fundamental impact is not to "put everyone out the door" overnight; it is to reorganize jobs and tasks, emptying some roles while leading to the emergence of some new ones. Creative destruction is very concrete here: between the disappearing old and the emerging new, young people, in particular, face the risk of becoming the intermediate generation in the story.

On the white-collar side, the impact of artificial intelligence is both more visible and more direct than on blue-collar workers. According to the ILO's exposure index, the occupational groups with the highest GenAI exposure include office and writing workers, data entry, secretarial work, basic administrative support, and customer service [(103)(104)(105)]. The common feature of these jobs is that they consist of repetitive and standardized tasks largely based on language, text, and standard procedures. Precisely, for this reason, young white-collar workers who write emails, fill out forms, generate standard reports, and frequently answer similar questions may suddenly find themselves in an office filled with

ChatGPT-style systems, feeling their work being piecemeal delegated to software. OECD findings also show that the nature of work changes in workplaces using AI; task intensity increases, privacy and surveillance concerns rise, but at the same time, opportunities for skill development and job satisfaction open up for some employees [101][102]. So, the picture is not black and white for white-collar workers; But the gray area is filled with anxiety.

A 2023 report by the McKinsey Global Institute, based on projections from the US, reveals that generative AI is moving a significant portion of tasks, particularly in office support, customer service, administrative roles, basic analysis, and content creation, into a category with high automation potential [105]. The same report emphasizes that by 2030, a significant proportion of total working hours could become open to automation, while new job demands will arise in healthcare, STEM, advanced engineering, maintenance, and creative-strategic fields [106]. In other words, creative disruption doesn't mean "all jobs will disappear" for white-collar workers, but rather "some job families will shrink while others will strengthen; however, generations that fail to adapt to this transition will pay a heavy price." This is particularly critical for young people fresh out of school and those not yet middle-aged: those who graduate with the wrong skill set and fail to reskill at the right time risk joining the "losers' club," as Schumpeter put it, in this transformation.

The St. Louis Fed's 2025 analysis supports this intuition with data: Comparing theoretical AI exposure indices for occupations with changes in unemployment rates over the past few years, it is seen that unemployment rates rise more in jobs with high exposure to AI, and the correlation is approximately 0.47 [107]. This does not mean that every story of someone saying "I lost my job because of AI" can be explained solely by AI; but it shows that the wave hits white-collar workers, especially those in routine office jobs, hardest. On the other hand, the IMF's 2024 study says that about 60 percent of jobs in developed economies will be affected by AI in some way, but a significant portion of this will be in the form of "job transformation" and increased productivity rather than complete job loss [106]. On the other hand, the UK's CIPD Human Resources Institute's 2025 report reveals that approximately one-sixth of employers expect to reduce their workforce next year directly due to AI, and that the most at risk are precisely these junior-administrative-professional white-collar roles [108]. So the picture is this: while macro texts talk about "transformation, productivity, reskilling," at the micro level, young workers face the warning that "software could replace them" in their first job.

This pressure is changing the content of white-collar work not only from a technical standpoint, but also from a psychological and existential perspective. OECD data shows that while job satisfaction increases in workplaces using AI, workload, performance pressure, and feelings of surveillance also rise; a significant portion of employees experience AI as both a helper and a competitor [101][102]. The IMF's assessment points to a similar dichotomy: while AI has the potential to significantly increase productivity and create new employment opportunities in the long term, it also increases the risk of skills mismatch and inequality in the short and medium term; young, low-senior, and low-bargaining-power employees are likely to be more severely affected. This, to use the language of your text, puts white-collar workers in a dilemma: on the one hand, the feeling that they have to "upgrade" using AI, and on the other hand, the fear of feeling more and more like a "replaceable employee" with each new tool. Creative destruction is becoming not just an economic story, but also a psychological one.

Then there's the employer side of things: CIPD's latest Labour Market Outlook report reveals that 17% of employers are considering reducing employment in the next 12 months due to AI, rising to 26% in large companies, with the biggest cuts expected in the "junior managerial, clerical, administrative, and professional" categories [108]. So the first wave of creative disruption is hitting the bottom rungs of the white-collar pyramid: young people fresh out of internships, finding their first corporate job, and just as they're about to fill out their CVs, they're confronted with the phrase, "we're now considering doing this job with AI." On the other hand, Teneo and similar CEO surveys show that a significant portion of large company executives see AI as a force opening up new entry points and new job areas; they particularly expect to move towards AI-powered, hybrid, new role designs at the entry level[109]. This further complicates the picture: the same technology can close the door for a junior analyst in one place, while opening a new door for a junior "AI prompt designer" or data-driven business analyst in another.

When we look at the blue-collar side, the picture is slightly different, but it operates on the same logic of creative destruction. In areas such as production, logistics, warehousing, and transportation, classic robotics and automation have long been changing the nature of work; artificial intelligence adds more layers of sensing, planning, maintenance, and optimization to this process. According to OECD and IMF studies, AI-powered automation increases efficiency in repetitive physical tasks while simultaneously creating new types of jobs requiring intermediate skills, such as maintenance technician, robot operator, and data-driven

process management (101)(106). The ILO's GenAI exposure index shows that the highest risk group is again office and administrative work; and that many blue-collar jobs are still being carried out with hybrid models rather than "fully automated" (103)(104). So, the risk for blue-collar workers is not so much "losing their jobs overnight," but rather the possibility of being left behind in workplaces where more work is done with fewer people, which are more intensive and more tightly monitored, and for those who do not have the technical skills to work with these new machines. Creative destruction leaves the same question here: will a new role open up for those who learn to work with these machines, while those who cannot will become footnotes, like calligraphers and weavers, or will policymakers be able to transform this transition into a truly “just transition”?

6. Regulations, Actions and Future

6.1 Regulations Around the World: European Union, China and United States of America

Today, the most comprehensive framework directly affecting employees and the job market is probably the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). This law adopts a risk-based approach and places AI systems used in the areas of "employment, employee management and access to self-employment" in the high-risk category (110). In other words, algorithms used in areas such as recruitment, promotion, dismissal, task assignment, and performance monitoring are no longer just random "HR software" under EU law; they are systems subject to oversight and entail serious obligations. Employers are required to analyze the data quality, transparency, human oversight, and impact on fundamental rights of these systems; otherwise, they risk not only a "feeling of injustice" but also legal sanctions (110). This tells us that, at least on paper, Europe does not want the "robo-boss" to have unlimited authority in the workplace.

When the Platform Work Directive is added on top of the AI Act, the picture becomes even clearer. This Directive, adopted by the EU Council in 2024 and entering into force in 2025, defines new rights for approximately 28 million people working on digital platforms, both in terms of employment status and algorithmic management (111). It introduces a "presumption in favor of the worker" to the debate of whether platform workers are "essentially employees or freelancers"; it also grants the right to receive information about the algorithms used in processes such as task assignment, scoring, and wage calculation, to demand human supervision, and to challenge automated decisions through appeals (111). In

other words, the EU is not just saying "AI can be dangerous"; it is directly trying to answer the question of "how do these algorithms monitor, punish, and make workers invisible?" through regulation. Studies commissioned by the European Parliament on algorithmic management also point out that even in traditional workplaces, algorithms increase workload, deepen surveillance, and make unionization more difficult (112).

On the Chinese side, the story is written in a slightly different language but with a similar set of concerns. The “Interim Measures for the Management of Generative AI Services,” which came into effect in 2023, place publicly available generative AI services under a strict framework in terms of scope and content: issues such as the security of training data, data labeling, content responsibility, user rights, and public order stand out (113). In addition, the Chinese state is enacting regulations to curb algorithmic management in the platform economy, especially in areas such as food delivery, by imposing some limitations on platform delivery times, wage calculations, and point systems that encourage risky behavior (114). However, these regulations are read more as a control effort focused on “social stability” and “preventing overexploitation,” rather than a model where the worker has a say over their own data and can transparently see how the algorithm works (114). Nevertheless, it should be noted that China is taking steps to make platform workers legally recognized subjects in the face of algorithmic management.

In the US, the picture is a complete patchwork. There is no comprehensive AI law at the federal level; Presidential Executive Order 14110, “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI,” issued during the Biden administration, set out principles that artificial intelligence should not weaken workers’ rights in the workplace, create excessive surveillance, or undermine union rights, and the Department of Labor also published a guide for employers with the document “AI and Worker Well-Being: Principles and Best Practices” (115). These documents recommended that AI be designed with a “worker well-being first” perspective; they included topics such as early worker involvement in the process, monitoring discrimination risks, and taking union negotiation seriously (115). But these were not binding, and the Presidential Executive Order was repealed by the new administration; thus, a significant part of the federal framework effectively became obsolete (117). Today, the most interesting development in the US is in local regulations such as New York City’s Local Law 144: This law mandates annual independent bias audits for automated decision-making systems used in hiring; It requires employers to publish the results of these audits and inform candidates(116). However, its

scope is limited; it focuses more on gender and race-based discrimination and reveals a scattered “state-city law mosaic” across the country(116).

6.2 “Are they perfect?” Of course not. Then what can be fixed?

On the regulatory side of artificial intelligence, we are actually looking at a huge "work in progress" picture: some parts of the world are trying to put on the brakes, some are accelerating, and most are about to burn out the clutch while trying to do both at the same time. One of the most comprehensive frameworks directly affecting employees and the job market today is the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act. This law adopts a risk-based approach and places artificial intelligence systems used in the areas of "employment, employee management and access to self-employment" in the high-risk category (109). In other words, algorithms used in areas such as recruitment, promotion, dismissal, task assignment, and performance monitoring are no longer just random "HR software" from the perspective of EU law; they are systems that create serious obligations in terms of data quality, transparency, human oversight, and impact on fundamental rights. The employer has the responsibility to conduct risk assessments, keep records, and face audits when necessary for these systems; otherwise, they face not only a "feeling of injustice" but also the risk of concrete legal sanctions (109).

With the addition of the Platform Work Directive on top of the AI Act, the picture becomes even clearer. This Directive, adopted by the EU Council in 2024, defines new rights for millions of people working on digital platforms, both in terms of employment status and algorithmic management (110). It introduces a presumption in favor of workers in the debate of whether platform workers are “primarily employees or freelancers”; it grants them the right to receive information about algorithms used in processes such as task assignment, scoring, and wage calculation, to demand human supervision, and to challenge automated decisions through appeals (110). The European Parliament and various studies show that even in traditional workplaces, algorithmic management increases workload, deepens surveillance, and makes unionization more difficult; therefore, the EU's new framework is read as part of a broader debate targeting not only platforms but algorithmic management in general (111).

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labeling, content responsibility, user rights, and public order stand out (112). In addition, the Chinese state has published regulations to curb algorithmic management in the platform economy and especially in areas such as food delivery, imposing limitations on delivery times, fee calculations, and point systems that encourage risky behavior; for example, provisions have been introduced requiring algorithms to calculate courier speed based on realistic assumptions and not create excessive time pressure (113). However, these regulations stand out more as a control effort focused on “maintaining social stability and curbing excessive exploitation” rather than a model where the worker has a say over their own data and can transparently see the working logic of the algorithm (112)(113).

In the US, the picture is a complete patchwork. There is no comprehensive AI law at the federal level; Executive Order 14110, “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence,” issued during the Biden administration, set out principles that artificial intelligence should not weaken workers' rights in the workplace, create excessive surveillance, or undermine union rights, and the Department of Labor also published a guide for employers with the document “AI and Worker Well-Being: Principles and Best Practices for Developers and Employers”(114)(115). These texts recommended that AI be designed with a “worker well-being first” perspective; that workers be involved in the process early; that risks of discrimination be monitored; and that union negotiations be taken seriously(115). However, with the change of administration in 2025, this Executive Order was repealed; a significant part of the federal framework effectively became obsolete, and the field was largely left to state and city regulations(116). One of the most symbolic examples in the US today is New York City Local Law 144, which mandates annual independent bias audits of automated decision-making systems used in recruitment: This law requires certain types of algorithmic recruitment tools to undergo annual audits, publish reports, and inform candidates; however, its scope is limited, focusing particularly on racial and gender-based discrimination, resulting in a scattered “state-city law mosaic” across the country(117)(119).

Despite all this effort, when we look at the picture from a distance, it is not difficult to see that most of the regulations we have are more like "first aid bandages" and have not yet reached the deeper wound. The first shortcoming is that most of the regulations focus on individual risks: discrimination, data protection, transparency, "high risk" lists... Yes, the AI Act considers recruitment and employee management algorithms to be high-risk; the Platform Work Directive demands transparency and human oversight in algorithmic management;

NYC Local Law 144 mandates bias audits (109)(110)(117). But these often remain at the level of "AI shouldn't choose the wrong person," "AI shouldn't systematically disadvantage certain groups." Deeper issues such as the way work is structured, the intensification of workload, the escalation of performance pressure, and the psychology of "employees being evaluated at all times" are either not regulated at all or are relegated to general labor law norms (111)(118). In other words, we are concerned with whose CV the algorithm rejects; But we still don't talk enough about how that same algorithm forces the system to run at a speed that will consume the remaining resources.

The second deficiency is geographical and class inequality. Even within the EU, the AI Act and the Platform Work Directive will only make sense if they are adapted into national law and effectively supported by oversight; in many member states, labor inspector capacity and union power are limited(111)(118). In the US, with the withdrawal of the federal framework, worker protection has become a legal lottery between cities and states; a candidate protected by bias audit in New York may not have the same protection in another state(117)(119). In China, the language of regulation often revolves around “national security,” “social stability,” and “ideological content”; even if significant steps are taken regarding the rights of gig workers, it is debatable how much space workers’ own voices and organized power will find within this framework(112)(113). In many countries in the Global South, these discussions are just beginning; however, the effects of AI on the labor market are already being felt through supply chains and remote work models. In short: The regulation map risks coinciding precisely with the inequality map generated by artificial intelligence.

The third shortcoming is that most of these regulations don't actually safeguard the "creative" aspect of creative destruction. While AI increases productivity, questions about who will benefit from this increase, who will benefit from the free time, and who will bear the cost of reskilling are often left to "economic policy" or "education policy"; they rarely enter the center of AI regulation (118). Studies on algorithmic management show that, especially among gig workers and employees with low bargaining power, algorithms tighten workloads, increase mental fatigue with constant scoring and monitoring, and weaken the sense of autonomy (120). But this reality hasn't yet evolved into a set of norms explicitly written to move from "AI should only be fair" to "AI should also produce work worthy of human dignity." Today's regulations try to mitigate the worst versions of AI; but they don't yet define the best possibilities that AI can create – more schoolwork, less drudgery, a fairer sharing of productivity – as a positive right.

6.3 ECOSOC’s future Impact(?)

From ECOSOC's perspective, when we look at this picture, we actually have a ready-made "normative compass": the Sustainable Development Goals. When discussing AI and the job market, especially youth employment, it is necessary to put SDG 8 – Decent Work and Economic Growth at the center of the table: "Sustainable, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all" (121). If we write AI policies outside of this sentence, we are left with "AI for competition, AI for innovation, AI for security" but "AI for decent work" is missing. SDG 9 – Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure reminds us that infrastructure and innovation are the main levers that determine the quality and location of employment; cloud infrastructure, data centers, platform economy and artificial intelligence ecosystem are no longer just technical projects, but directly an employment architecture (122). SDG 10 – Reduced Inequalities adds to this picture: If this architecture increases income and opportunity inequality, then we have the risk of digital feudalism, not a “successful AI transformation” (122).

When we combine all this in the language of ECOSOC, the following framework may emerge: SDG 8 + SDG 9 + SDG 10 + SDG 4 (Quality Education) are the “holy quartet” that must be read together when discussing youth employment in the age of AI(121)(122)(123). SDG 4 means “leaving young people to their fate” in the AI-powered job market without securing quality and inclusive education and lifelong learning(123). However, ECOSOC is one of the main platforms coordinating both the education-employment transition and technological transformation at the global level. Therefore, it must integrate AI policies not only under the heading of “innovation” but also directly with policies that “support the transition of young people from school to work and financially and institutionally secure their reskilling processes.” In short: if AI investment is to be made, it must be made simultaneously in the direction of SDG 4 and SDG 8; otherwise, creative destruction will be sheer destruction for generations who have not yet completed their education.

In conclusion: If we are taking the concept of creative destruction from Schumpeter and applying it to today's AI economy, then ECOSOC needs to loudly ask the question: "Whose account is the creativity on, and whose account is the destruction on?" If the productivity increase resulting from AI is credited to the balance sheets of a few technology giants and capital groups, while the destruction is borne by young people who become unemployed during the transition period, precarious platform workers, and the "middle children of history" who pay for retraining out of their own pockets, then this is not creative

destruction, but simply "destruction of creativity." Perhaps the most radical but simplest framework that ECOSOC can establish on the SDG 8-9-10-4 axis is this: AI is only a legitimate development tool insofar as it gives young people a humane life horizon for their labor, time, and creativity(121)(122)(123). For this, a real global negotiation process is needed where young people have a say in every issue, from algorithm design to data ownership, from reskilling to social protection. Otherwise, while we market AI as "creative destruction," history will once again not hesitate to add the middle children to the footnotes.

7. Questions to be addressed

1. How can Member States ensure that AI-driven “creative destruction” does not simply become “destruction of creativity” for young people?
2. In what ways can ECOSOC help align national AI strategies with SDG 8 (Decent Work), SDG 4 (Quality Education), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities)?
3. How should member states emphasize to regulate the use of AI in hiring, firing, promotion and workplace monitoring to prevent discrimination and algorithmic abuse against young workers and jobseekers?
4. What minimum global standards should apply to platform work and algorithmic management to protect young workers from becoming a “programmable proletariat”?
5. How can Member States and international organizations support a just transition for young people in sectors where AI and automation are likely to displace routine white-collar and blue-collar jobs?
6. What policies are needed to prevent a widening gap between high-skilled, AI-empowered youth and low-skilled or NEET youth who risk permanent marginalization from the labor market?
7. How can education systems (formal and non-formal) be restructured so that young people are not only AI users, but also co-creators and critical shapers of AI systems?
8. How can international cooperation under ECOSOC help prevent a new “techno-feudal” divide between countries that control AI infrastructure and data, and those that mainly supply cheap digital labor and raw data—often through their youth?

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